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IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MORTON INTERNATIONAL,
INC., a corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

SOUTHERN PACIFIC TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, a corporation,

Case No.

12557

Defendant-Respondent.

REPLY BRIEF
This brief is submitted by Morton International, Inc.
("Morton") in reply to the brief filed by Southern
Pacific Transportation Company ("Southern Pacific").
The questions involved in the validity of the lower
court's summary judgment have been discussed extensively in the memoranda to that court and the briefs filed
in this Court, and a restatement here of the issues and
arguments would be inappropriate. However, the Southern Pacific brief contains a major factual inaccuracy
which requires correction and cites some cases which
require reply. To facilitate reference between this brief
and Southern Pacific's brief, the format of the latter has
been adopted here.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Southern Pacific's brief does not controvert or
comment upon the Statement of Facts set out in Morton's
brief. In view of the requirement that a respondent's
brief specify the matters, if any, wherein an appellant's
statement is claimed to be inconsistent with the facts
(Rule 75(p) (2), URCP), the Statement in Morton's
brief is presumably correct and sufficient.
ARGUMENT
POINT IA
MORTON'S DILIGENCE
GREAT SALT LAKE.

WATER

RIGHTS

IN

(a) The Factual Inaccuracy.
Morton's brief shows in detail the legal basis for its
diligence rights, acquired before statehood, to use Lake
waters. The Southern Pacific brief does not attempt any
rebuttal to this historical legal analysis. Instead, the only
response is an assertion that the Deseret Livestock case
[Deseret Livestock v. State, 110 Utah 239, 171 P.2d 401
(1946)] controls this case because the water right relied
on there was a pre-1903 'diligence right, like Morton's,
which the Southern Pacific says this Court held invalid.
The Southern Pacific then, "because of the importance
of this fact" (p. 9, Southern Pacific brief), proceeds to
quote from the Deseret Livestock's brief and the
record in the case.

The "fact" to which Southern

Pacific attaches such importance and upon which
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its argument depends is, however, not a fact, and its
assertion only appears plausible by the manner in which
the quotations are presented.
The Southern Pacific's quotations are both inaccurrate
and out of context. Even a cursory reading of the brief
and record in the Deseret Livestock case, as we will
show below, does not support Southern Pacific's inexplicable statement.
Page 9 of Southern Pacific's brief contains the
following quotes from widely separated portions of
Deseret Livestock's brief on appeal:
"Salt water was appropriated and used [by
Deseret Livestock Co.] for the purpose of extracting salts and minerals therefrom prior to the
adoption of our Constitution. Our constitution
provided in Article 17 Section 1: 'All existing
rights to use any of the waters in this State, for
any useful or beneficial purpose, are hereby
recognized and confirmed.' Here the constitution
confirms the use for which plaintiff seeks to
appropriate this water as proper and beneficial.
[pp. 10-11]
"We have also pointed out that the right to
appropriate the waters of the Great Salt Lake,
and apply the same to a beneficial use, such as
that proposed by the Appellant, was practiced
and recognized before the constitution of this
State was adopted, and has therefore been by the
constitution expressly recognized and protected
as a water right Mtd a method of applying water
to a beneficial use. [p. 27] [Emphasis added]"
The insertion of the bracketed words "[by Deseret Live-
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stock Co.]" makes the text appear to reflect Deseret
Livestock's claim to a diligence right. There were no
such words in the brief and they were inserted by Southern Pacific. In actuality, and in the context of the brief,
it is perfectly plain that the reference is to the diligence
rights of other salt producers, i.e., Morton's predecessors, with whom Deseret Livestock was proposing to
compete by the contemplated use of the water being
applied for. A quote of the following language from
Deseret Livestock's brief establishes this:
"At the time appellant's water right was initiated, and at the tin1e the issue was raised by the
protest of the State Land Board, the law not only
permitted the appropriation of the waters of
Great Salt Lake by the method followed by this
plaintiff as outlined above, but, as a matter of
fact, appropriations had previously been made
and were then being enjoyed, and has so been
recognized by the defendants, without protest or
controversy continuously for more than fifty (50)
years. All of this is clearly shown by the following facts:
"The Inland Salt Company was incorporated
in 1887. The Inland Crystal Salt Company was
incorporated July 2 1891. (Page 44 of Record)
'
.
The Royal Crystal Salt Company was mcorporated in 1927 (Page 43 of Record), and it further
appears that the Royal Crystal Salt Company is
the same corporation as the original Inland Salt
Company and the Inland Crystal Salt Company.
The Company merely amended its Articles of
Incorporation to change its name (Page 43 of
Record).
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companies have been producing salt by
evaporat10n of the waters of Great Salt Lake in
the same manner as proposed by appellant since
the date of their incorporation. (Page 46 of
Record)
"That the Royal Crystal Salt Company has a
factory and office in Salt Lake County, Utah,
employing approximately one hundred (100)
people, and having a value of one half million
dollars, (Page 44-45 of Record), an'd are now and
for over fifty (50) years last past have been producing salt from the Waters of Great Salt Lake.
"That they have not filed a royalty contract
with the State Land Board for the appropriation
of this water, nor have they at any time been
requested to so file, either by the State Engineer
or the State Land Board. (Page 46-47 of
Record)" [pp. 3-4, Brief of Deseret Livestock,
Statement of Facts.]
Deseret Livestock then attempted to compare the
filing of its application with the diligence rights of its
proposed competitors:
"Plaintiff further contends that this basic
right, acquired by the filing of this application,
is no less a substantial right than is the right to
specific performance, which is initiated or created
by the execution of [sic] contract to convey real
estate. For example: This equity of specific
performance never ripens or matures into a
complete right until the terms, conditions and
provisions of the contract have been fully
executed by the purchaser. The plaintiff believes
the analogy between the position of an appropriator of water after filing his application
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and that of a seller, after executing an executory
contract is perfect. Furthermore, Article 1,
Section 24 of our constitution, provides 'All laws
of a general nature shall be uniform in operation.'
This result can only be accomplished by affording
to this appropriator the same rights and
privileges, by virtue of the filing of its application with the State Engineer, as has been given
to all other applications filed under the same
law at any time from date of its enactment to the
effective date of the new law.
"The publication of notice as required by Title
100-3-6, was completed on the 14th day of March,
1941. By law, Revised Statutes of Utah 1933,
100-3-7, protestants were given 30 days after the
completion of the publication in which to file
protests. Under the law, therefore, any protest to
this application could not be filed after April 13,
1941. The law relied upon by defendants did not
become effective until May 13, 1941 - 30 days
after. It is, therefore, clear that no such protest
could have been filed within the time allowed by
law, based upon the law as it existed during the
protest period.
"Salt water was appropriated and used for
the purpose of extracting salts and minerals
therefrom prior to the adoption of our constitution. Our constitution provided in Article 17,
Section 1:
'All existing rights to the use of any of
the waters in this State, for any useful or
beneficial purpose, are hereby recognized and
confirmed.'
"Here the constitution confirms the use for
which plaintiff seeks to appropriate this water
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as proper and beneficial." [pp. 9-11 Brief of Desseret Livestock, Argument.] ',1
'
Deseret Livestock, in its brief, was arguing that
Morton's predecessors, who had been appropriating
waters from since before Statehood, were not being
required to pay royalties to the State, and that to require
Deseret Livestock to do so would put the Livestock
Company at a competitive disadvantage. (See the quotation from Deseret Livestock's brief in the Appendix.
hereto.) Deseret Livestock did not claim a diligence
right for itself.
Southern Pacific's brief also (page 9) purports to
quote a sentence from Deseret Livestock's water application, as follows :
"This appropriation is an old appropriation
originally made prior to 1903 for the purpose of
recovering the salt and the mineral content of the
water appropriated."
Actually, the above sentence is an incorrect quotation
from a portion of the material set out under the
"Explanatory" section of the Deseret Livestock application, the material portion of which reads as follows:
"This appropriation is an old appropriation
originally made prior to 1903 and which has been
used beneficially by applicant and its predecessors in interest since prior to 1903 for the purpose
of recovering the salt and mineral content of the
water appropriated. The water from the diverting channel is pumped into evaporation ponds
1The last three sentences are the actual quotations from the
Deseret Livestock brief without Southern Pacific's editing.
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located upon the property of the applicant bordering upon the lake and located in Sections 34 &
35 in Township 1 South, Range 4 W., and Sections
3* and 2 Township 2 South, Range 4 West,
S.L.B. & M. This application is made for the '{YUrpose of ,acquiring a right to the use of the waters
sought to be appropriated with a priority
right as of the date of the original filing of this
application and not for the purpose of acquiring
by this applioation awy priority from the period
of the first use. (Emphasis added) [Footnoted
material omitted]
In the copy of the water application on file in the office
of the State Engineer (File No. 15-306) the italicized
portion of the paragraph, which Southern Pacific inexplicably omitted, is typewritten in red.
Against the background of the Deseret Livestock's
purported position as presented by Southern Pacific, the
passage from this Court's opinion in Deseret Livestock
appearing on Page 10 of the Southern Pacific brief
appears to have a meaning which is different from what
the Court said.
The record of Deseret Livestock is clear that the
water right being applied for was one which, if pursued
and proved up, would have a priority of December 1940,
and not a date prior to 1903. The State Engineer's
decision involved that application; the complaint in
district court and the appeal to this Court concerned
themselves with the substantive content of such an
application; and the opinion of this Court decided
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the rights thereunder. The Certificate of Appropriation
issued after Deseret Livestock's successor filed its proof
(No. 5513) shows the priority of the right to be December
21, 1940, the filing date of the application.
The bound copies of the briefs in Deseret Livestock,
being typewritten, appear in the black-bound set of miscellaneous odd-sized briefs (Case No. 6928). The water
application (No. 13988) is regularly filed in the State
Engineer's records.
In summary, notwithstanding the Southern Pacific
presentation which is described above, the facts and the
legal question of the Deseret Livestock case differ from
those of this case. That case is not in point. Morton's
diligence water right, as shown in its first brief, is a
valid and vested property right.
(b) Shive'[;y v. Bowlby Not Applicable.
·Southern Pacific has sought to avoid the constitutional issue involved in this case by citing Shively v.
Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 14 S.Ct. 548 (1893), contending that
Morton could not acquire a valid water right because the
United States held navigable waters in trust for the State
of Utah until its admission to the Union. Shively v.
Bowlby does not so hold. The case did not involve water
rights; it involved land. The contention made by
Southern Pacific here was made, and squarely rejected,
in Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 456, 83 S.Ct. 1468
( 1963). In that case Arizona argued that Indian water
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rights in the Colorado River, claimed on the basis of the
Indian reservations established by the United States
during Arizona territorial times, could not have
accrued because such navigable waters were held in
trust for the future State. The contention was denied and
Shivel1J v. Bowlby was, in express terms, held to have
no bearing in water rights matters. 83 S.Ct., at 1496.
In passing, however, it should be noted that Shively
v. Bowlby merely held that a particular federal grant
should not be interpreted as including the land under
navigable water. Contrary to Southern Pacific's brief,
it did not hold that the federal government did not have
the power to vest title in individuals while the land was
a territory. Part VIII of the opinion expressly held that
the federal government did have this power, while part
IX, from which the quotation on page 11 of Southern
Pacific's brief is taken, held that the government did not
generally grant land under navigable water, and part X
held that the grant in question did not include land under
navigable water.
The rule is that navigable waters may be appropriated, subject only to the limitation that the use of the
water may not substantially interfere with its navigable
capacity. Arizona v. California, sitpra; 1 Wiel, Water

Rights in the Western States,
(3rd Ed. 1911). Wiel
states (P. 360): "The water of navigable streams may be
appropriated as well as the water of those not
navigable."

11
POINT IB
MORTON'S ROYALTY AGREEMENT WITH THE
STATE.

The Southern Pacific makes no attempt to answer
Morton's point that Southern Pacific, a stranger to the
Royalty Agreement, may not challenge its validity,
except to state that the argument is absurd, thus ignoring
the authorities cited by Morton to support this position.

In an effort to show that Morton's purported failure
to comply with §65-1-15, Utah Code Annotated (1953),
is a bar to this action, Southern Pacific cites Cotton.wood
Mall Shoppi;ng Center, Inc. v. Utah Power arnd Light Co.,
440 F.2d 36 (10th Cir. 1971). Southern Pacific's reliance
on Cottonwood Mall, however, is misguided since that
case is not in point. Cottonwood Mall, the owner of a
shopping center, sued the local power company, a public
utility, for attempting to monopolize the market for
electrical power at the center by interfering with Cottonwood Mall's contracts to sell power to its tenants. The
power company, as part of its defense, sought and
obtained a preliminary injunction against Cottonwood
Mall restraining it from selling such power. The entire
case turned on a question of construction of a Utah public
utilities statute, i.e., either Cottonwood Mall was acting
legally, under an exception to the statute, in selling
power to its tenants without a certificate of convenience
and necessity, or the power company was acting legally
to protect itself against an illegal attempt to interfere
with its service to public consumers. The statute was
construed in favor of the power company and it won the
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case. Had it been construed the other way, Cottonwood
Mall would have won. The case merely stands for the
proposition, which is axiomatic, that a person cannot
recover against a public utility for alleged acts of monopolization where the utility was acting within the scope
of its statutory monopoly.
That is not this case. Here the Southern Pacific is
seeking to invalidate a viable contract between Morton
and the State in order to avoid liability for its tortious
acts on the ground that the parties had failed to follow
proper statutory procedures when the contract was
executed. Unlike the power company, Southern Pacific
has not been granted any statutory rights with respect
to the Lake, either monopolistic or otherwise, which could
afford it protection against Morton's right to seek a
remedy for interference with its salt extraction
operations.
POINT II.

MORTON'S RIGHT TO MAINTAIN THIS SUIT.

Southern Pacific has cited no authority which
supports its singular position that Morton is remediless
to protect itself against loss of its plant investment at
the Lake due to the effect of the causeway. Southern
Pacific, by rather tortuous reasoning, attempts to fix
the label of "licensee" to Morton. Having then reached
that highly questionable result, Southern Pacific cites
cases which it states purport to hold that a licensee has
no remedy against a third party who has interfered with
the exercise of the license. None of those cases so hold.
Those cases merely hold that the form of a.ction (e.g.,
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ejectment, trespass q.c.f., trover) selected by each plaintiff was not the proper remedy in that particular
instance. Southern Pacific's argument, having been so
constructed, falls of its own weight like a house of cards.
Without attempting to reargue the points previously
presented in Morton's initial brief, we do feel compelled
to bring to the Court's attention that Southern Pacific
has omitted several pertinent statements in the authorities it cites which are contrary to its position.
For example, Southern Pacific argues that a license is
determined by whether the instrument grants an
exclusive or non-exclusive right. However, in Tiffany,
Law of Re;al Property, §839 at p. 428 (3d Ed. 1939), the
following sentence appears:
"A profit a prendre may be exclusive of any
right in the landowner or in other persons to
take that particular profit, or it may not be so
exclusive." [Emphasis added]
As indicated in Morton's prior brief, non-exclusivity is
not the test of whether one holds a license or not.
Again, at page 24 of its brief, Southern Pacific
quotes from Tiffany (the quotation is said to be from
§839 of Tiffany; actually it is from §840). The complete
quote of the paragraph, only a portion of which was
reproduced in Southern Pacific's brief, reads as follows:

"One having a profit a prendre has a right, as
against the members of the conununity generally,
including the owner of the land, that they shall
not interfere with the exercise or enjoyment of
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the profit. It is in this respect that a license to
sever particular things from the land is to be
distinguished from a profit a prendre, the licensee
having no right to freedom from interference by
third persons or by the landowner himself, the
distinction between a license and a profit a
prendre being in a general way similar to that
between a license and an easement. It is, as a
result, it seems, of the absence of any duty on the
part of the landowner to refrain from interference
with the exercise of the license privilege that
the license is revocable at the pleasure of the
licensor." [Emphasis added]
The Southern Pacific's response to the point that the
operating interest under the Royalty Agreement constitutes a profit a prendre, a profit in gross, or a incorporeal hereditament, is an argument that the interest is
none of these because such interests are interests in the
mineral before its extraction. (Southern Pacific's brief,
p. 23). This is, of course, precisely the point. Southern
Pacific has sought to analyze the legal problem by assuming the answer before addressing itself to the question.
Where, as here, the assumed answer is incorrect, the
analysis is not persuasive.
In any event, the holder of a license is entitled to
maintain an action to preserve the rights granted thereunder. Southern Pacific cites Nahas v. Local 905, Retail
Clerks International Association, 144 Cal.App.2d 808,
302 P.2d 829 (1956) for the proposition that even if a
license is irrevocable the licensee may not sue a third
party for obstructing his exercise of the license privilege.
The case does not so hold. It simply holds that a licensee
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has no right of action in trespass or ejectment. Contrary
to Southern Pacific's assertion, the Court states:
"Because a licensee has no interest in the land
he cannot maintain an action in trespass or ejectment. At the most, he may maintaim an actio'YIJ to
enjoin or to redress a violation of his right to
exercise the license. See Annotation in 139
A.L.R. 1204. The principle is thus stated in Bell
Telephone Co. of Pennsylvania v. Baltimore &
0.R.Co., 155 Pa.Super. 286, 38 A.2d 732, 733: 'It
is true that a license does not confer a right of
possession sufficient to support an action in trespass quare clausum fregit (Tiffany, Real
Property §§ 814, 829), or an action of ejectment.
Union Petroleum Co. v. Bliven Petroleum. Co.,
72 Pa. 173. But a licensee may mailntain am.. actio'YIJ
of trespass in the nature of commonrlaw case for
arvy invasion or disturbance of the terms of the
license whether by the licensor or by third
parties.'" (302 P.2d at 830-31) [Emphasis added]
This case and V 0 n Goerlitz v. Turner, 65 Cal. App.
2d 475, 150 P.2d 278 (1944) and Oaledonian. Coal Co. v.
Rocky Cliff Coal Mining Co., 16 N.M. 517, 120 Pac. 715
(1911), the cases relied on by Southern Pacific, actually
support Morton's right to maintain this action.
1

POINT III.
MORTON'S RIGHTS ARE NOT SUBJECT TO
SOUTHERN PACIFIC'S CAUSEWAY BY STATUTE.

The argument put forward in Southern Pacific's
brief under Point III is unsupported and has been effectively rebutted in Morton's initial brief.
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CONCLUSION
The summary judgment granted by the court below
should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
Hardin A. Whitney
John W. Horsley

Of Counsel:
Frank A. W ollaeger
Paul D. Frenz
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APPENDIX
The following language is quoted from the brief of
Deseret Livestock Co. filed in the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah in the case entitled Deseret Livestock
Company v. State of Utah and Ed H. Watson, State
Engineer of the State of Utah, Case No. 6928, at the
pages indicated:
[pp. 4-5]
"That on April 26, 1921, the State Engineer
for the State of Utah, issued certificate No. 1090
to the Salt Lake Potash Company certifying the
appropriation by this company of 26.7 cubic feet
of water per second from Great Salt Lake for the
purpose of recovering therefrom salts and
minerals.
"That no royalty contract has been requested
or filed from this company (Page 40-41 of
Record).
"That on October 19, 1938, an application for
appropriation of the Crystal White Salt Company
was filed for 10 cubic feet per second of waters
from Great Salt Lake for the purpose of
recovering therefrom salt and minerals.
"That appropriation was approved by the
State Engineer's Office September 8, 1938, and
an extension granted to applicant to December
31, 1944. And the State Engineer has not requested this applicant to file a royalty contract
with either the State Land Board or the State
Engineer of Utah. (Page 40-41 of Record)
"From the above, it is very apparent that the
practice of evaporating salt and minerals from
the waters of Great Salt Lake has prior to the
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adoption of the Constitution of this State up to
and including the present time, been
and pursued as a useful and beneficial purpose.
And the right to appropriate the waters by the
public has been recognized by the State Engineer's Office at all times, up to and including the
present time."

•••

[pp. 21-23]
"We desire especially at this point to direct
the Court's attention to the economic effect
created by the retroactive application of this
statute and particularly to the monopoly its
application will create in regard to the use of
the waters of Great Salt Lake. We have
presented to the Court in our Statement of
Facts that the Royal Crystal Salt Company, a
large and extensive producer of salt in this
State, is now and for over fifty years has been
producing salt without the requirement of filing
a royalty contract. It becomes apparent that
the State Engineer or the State Land Board,
in not demanding a royalty contract from the
Royal Crystal Salt Company are making an interpretation which recognizes the rights of that
Company as an appropriator of water in this
State with a vested right which cannot be affected
by the provisions of the 1941 amendments. This is
likewise true of the Salt Lake Potash Company
which now has a Certificate of Appropriation.
It also becomes evident by the interpretation of
the State Land Board and the State Engineer in
not requiring a royalty contract from the Crystal
White Salt Company, whose certificate of appro'"
priation has not been issued, that these two
government agencies recognize that the Crystal
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White Salt Company has a vested right which
cannot be affected by these amendments.
"The economic effect of these interpretations,
giving to these three companies the right to take
the water of Great Salt Lake without the burden
of a royalty contract, creates of necessity a monopoly, as there can be no competition while these
three remain free of the burden of the royalty.
Furthermore, if the State Engineer and the
Land Board recognize in these companies a right
of appropriation, as herein pointed out, it is
clearly a recognition of the fact that the waters of
the Great Salt Lake are subject to appropriation
and are no different in their nature than any
other water of the State, and this certainly is the
position of the appellant. Particularly in regard
to the application of the Crystal White Salt Company it might be asked, 'What right or position do
they have different from the rights or position of
the appellant?'; for the Crystal White Salt Company has not had issued to them their certificate,
nor have they made proof of appropriation, and
yet they are not required to comply with the
provisions of this Act.
"Surely the State Engineer, and the Land
Board, would be estopped by their interpretation
of the law as applied to the Crystal White Salt
Company wherein they determine they are free
of any royalty burden, and yet attempt to place
such a burden upon the appellant. It is impossible
to reconcile the position of the Land Board
in apparently recognizing a vested right of
appropriation in the three companies mentioned,
free of a royalty obligation, and at the
same time claim the State has title and the
right to sell the water of Great Salt Lake,
and therefore the right to require appellant
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to pay a royalty on salt produced. Here
again, Article I, Section 24 of our Constitution,
providing that 'all laws of a general nature shall
be uniform in operation,' is offended inasmuch
as the State in attempting to sell the salt excludes
the three largest appropriators from the obligation to pay for the salt they recover."

